ࡱ> +,*ܥhc eABRA?PlPllQlQlQlQlQQQQQQQQQQCQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQXIR{QlQQ"$QQQQQQlQlQQQQQQQlQQlQQQ QQlQlQlQlQQQQQ HEATHROW TERMINAL 5 DECISION AIR QUALITY Introduction This briefing is one of a series that summarises the key arguments and issues in the T5 Public Inquiry and the inspectors conclusions. The briefing is not intended as a review of the data and technical issues these should be sought in the inspectors report and in the inquiry documents. A particular aim is to highlight the policy and strategy issues that appear most important not just in the context of the T5 decision, but in the context of air quality strategy in general. Air Quality was addressed in Topic 6 of the inquiry. The main objectors were the local authorities (LAs) and Friends of the Earth (FoE) also presented detailed evidence. This briefing is taken almost entirely from the inspectors report. Reference is made to the positions and arguments of various parties, but this is not in any way a summary or review of their case. The references are made simply as a means of describing the issue or case. Quotes are used where possible in order to minimise paraphrasing by the author. The quotes are all from the report. That is, they are what the inspector has reported the parties as arguing, not original quotes from the parties themselves. Comments enclosed in [ ] are either explanatory notes to add context or are additional material that seems relevant and was available to the inquiry and but which is not (to the authors knowledge) given in the report. The final decision was taken by the Secretary of State, Stephen Byers, and this is documented in the Decision Letter and in his statement to the House of Commons. The Sec of State did not disagree with the inspector on any issues concerning air pollution so the view of one can be taken as the view of the other except. (There is one exception see Position of government, para 2). Air quality modelling (simulation) Elaborate air quality computer modelling was done by BAA. The Highways Agency did some for the vicinity of major road and the local authorities (LAs) did their own modelling. [The LAs work was limited because they ran out of money. Earlier their lead officer left to join BAA.] A range of pollutants was modelled but only NO2 and PM10 were in concentrations that came anywhere near to breaching the standards. Ozone was not modelled because of the difficulties of doing so [ozone concentrations tend to appear well away from the sources of emissions]. The inspector concluded It [the modelling] is subject to a range of uncertainties but I find no reason to believe that these are more likely to produce over-estimates than under-estimates. The results There were a number of disputes and differences of opinion between the parties on the modelling and consequent results, but the effect on the results was not great. It was generally accepted that pollution levels would tend to fall between now and the completion of T5 (then 2016). This fall would be greater without T5, but levels would fall even with T5. There was also agreement that air quality would continue to breach standards for NO2 and PM10 in some areas close to the airport. Surprisingly, the report does not indicate (with maps) the area where standards/objectives would be breached. It is noted : The effect of T5 would be relatively small when compared with the levels expected anyway. Taking the receptors where standards would be breached, average NO2 concentrations would exceed the Strategy objectives by 8% without Terminal 5, but by 21% with it. The average breach for PM10 would rise from 10% without Terminal 5 to 17% with. The LAs summarised the relative contributions of aircraft and other sources : Closer to the airport, the proportion contributed by aircraft of total emissions of NOX in the near Heathrow region would rise from 48.9% in 1993 to 73.1% in the 4T (2016) case; and to 77.9% in the 5T case. Within the perimeter road the proportions due to aircraft would rise from 58.1% to 77.8 % and 83.8% respectively, with similar patterns for PM10. It was also noted by the LAs that .. the conclusions drawn in DOT/5020 [an inquiry document submitted by the previous Department of Transport] , that the Government believed that air traffic was unlikely to be a major contributor to exceedances of regulated pollutants around airports, were not borne out in relation to Heathrow. What effect by T5 would be considered to be significant ? The local authorities (LAs) acknowledged the differences due to Terminal 5 were small but suggested that they were similar to the 5-10% gap which, according to the Secretary of State, had to be met if the objectives of the National Air Quality Strategy were to be achieved. BAA and, more importantly, the inspector did not say what differences they would consider important. Do air quality standards or objectives have to be met ? BAA argued in effect that they do not The recently published Review of the National Air Quality Strategy [NAQS] concluded that annual mean concentrations of NO2 would exceed the objectives at many locations in London. There would also be widespread breaches of the PM10 objectives. While the annual objective for NO2 would be retained, the cost of achieving it would be high in relation to the benefits and in some cases could not be justified in cost-benefit terms. The objective would be reconsidered and in doing so the Government would ensure that local authorities did not have to take extreme action which would lead to severe disruption or damage to their local economies. The Inspector agreed, adding: .. achieving the objectives for NO2 and PM10 in London would be costly in relation to the relatively small benefits to be achieved. Are T5 emissions significant if air quality is within standards ? BAA argued that if standards are not breached, emissions from T5 are not an issue : The impact of the proposal in air quality terms should be weighed as part of the overall balance of costs and benefits. Where there was no prediction of an exceedance of a National Air Quality Strategy objective, then for that pollutant there would be no harm to any interest of acknowledged importance. FoE argued that it was an objective to minimise air pollution per se. The fact that standards/objective were not breached did not mean there were no health effects. Also, effects other than on human heath were recognised explicitly in the form of more stringent vegetation guidelines. The inspector did not express a view on the issue and did not refer to it in his analysis and conclusions. One must therefore conclude he did not regard pollution levels below objectives let alone (human health) standards an issue worthy of consideration. Should air quality issues influence development ? BAAs central argument was while air quality objectives are important, government policy does not intend these to prevent development : If the approach favoured by the local authorities were correct the National Air Quality Strategy [NAQS] would prevent development in areas where air quality was close to or above the objectives. This was manifestly not the intention of the Strategy or Government policy generally. They added The impact of Terminal 5 should be assessed against these objectives and the degree of significance attached to the differences in concentrations could only be assessed in terms of the effect on health. They were relevant to a judgement as to whether a development would be harmful but were not intended to be criteria by which acceptability could be decisively determined. The LAs argued In relation to Heathrow, the authorities argued that the only effective means of control was through the planning system. This meant that the choice was between pursuit of the Strategy and the construction of Terminal 5 . Nearly 90% of aircraft NOx emissions were not amenable to control and in total some 84% of airport emissions at 2016 would be uncontrollable. The inspector accepted BAAs view rather than the LAs : The most important point is that proper weight must be given to the breaches of the Governments air quality objectives in the light of the National Air Quality Strategy. ..In any event, the Strategy is only one of a whole range of Government policies which applies to Terminal 5. The undisputed fact that it would not meet the objectives of that Strategy must count against this proposal but it cannot mean that planning permission must be refused. .. there is no requirement in planning terms that a proposal which led to the breach of the [National Air Quality] Strategy objectives should be refused planning permission. What implications would agreement to T5 have on NAQS ? The LAs were unequivocal : Terminal 5 would make these [air quality] objectives virtually impossible to secure and a 5 terminal airport would be the biggest single reason why they could not be met . The choice before the Secretary of State was to have either Terminal 5 or the NAQS. .. To permit a development which would lead to breaches of the objectives would essentially negate the whole purpose of the Strategy. Terminal 5 would be a major challenge to the Strategy and would signal that it did not really matter if the air quality objectives were not met. The Inspector responded I do not share this view. I do not question the importance the Government attaches to improving air quality and the National Air Quality Strategy. Air Quality Management Areas The LAs said .. the whole impact would be negative. Heathrow was in an area which already experienced the highest levels of NO2 and PM10 in the country and similar to those in central London. Air quality in the area would exceed the objectives set in the National Air Quality Strategy and would become an Air Quality Management Area. BAA agreed an AQMA would probably need to be declared but added Terminal 5 would make it harder to meet the objectives but would not affect the ability of the local authorities to fulfill their duties. The issue of balance The crux of BAAs case was that while the impact of development on air quality was important it must be weighed against other material considerations. To be a potential ground for the refusal of planning permission the impact would have to be significant. The inspector agreed .. the objectives in [NAQS] it are policy objectives which take into account the costs and benefits of their achievement. .. This clearly means that the Government accepts a balance has to be struck in setting the objectives.. In this context, I have already concluded that refusing permission for Terminal 5 would damage the national and regional economies as well as the local economy. He also said Its [T5s] impact on air quality in general and the objectives of the Strategy must be a factor weighing against its approval but would not necessarily outweigh the benefits of the proposed development. Indeed the Strategy itself recognises the need for a balance between costs and benefits and the need to avoid harm to the local economy. Position of government The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR, now DLTR) explained the position of neutrality that it had adopted with regard to aviation matters generally applied also to the air quality impact of Terminal 5 from aviation sources. [Yet the DETR government used BAAs witnesses to write and present their evidence.] The inspector recommended that a limit of 480,000 pa be placed on the number of flights. The government accepted this limit, but there was a subtle but important comment in the decision letter [The Sec of State] notes the inspectors views expressed .. that the ATM [flights] limit would have benefits in terms of other factors such as surface access, air quality and public safety but the Secretary of State does not consider it necessary to express a conclusion on these matters. This suggests that the government does not accept that air pollution is an issue that should prevent the limit being breached. This is an important issue, because there are compelling reasons to believe that this condition will be broken within the next years. Health effects BAA argued that even if air pollution levels were well above standards/objectives there would not necessarily be adverse health effects. The inspector refuted this In my view, the only acceptable approach is to apply the objectives of the National Air Quality Strategy directly and to conclude that where these are breached there is harm and specifically that will be an increased risk to human health. On this basis Terminal 5 is likely to cause harm and to have an adverse impact on health as a result of the concentrations of both NO2 and PM10. But he immediately adds This is not to say however, that the increased risk is likely to be substantial. As I have already noted the local authorities recognised that the increased concentrations caused by Terminal 5 would be small. I also accept that there are likely to be substantial reductions in concentrations of both NO2 and PM10 by 2016 as compared with 1993 even if Terminal 5 is built so that the risk to health is likely to be less than at present. A study carried out for BAA by Professor Bridges found no health effects due to air pollution near Heathrow. The inspector dismissed this, noting major shortcomings of the study and saying In such circumstances I do not find the absence of any [reported] differences in health to be surprising.. Friends of the Earth used inquiry and government data to produce a rough estimate of the deaths due to air pollution from T5. This result was is 17 deaths pa at 2016 and 59pa from Heathrow as a whole. These were based on BAAs forecast of only 50/80m pa passengers (ie 50m without T5 and 80 with T5), whereas the inspector was firmly of the view that the throughput would be higher. The results were not challenged by BAA or the inspector. They were however relegated to the Topic Report and ignored in the inspectors analysis and conclusions. Economic cost Friends of the Earth used inquiry government and other data to produce a rough estimate of the economic cost of air pollution from T5. The result was 46m pa per annum in 2016 due to T5 assuming a 60/100m pa passengers. [The estimate only took account of the effect on human heath, other effects such as corrosion being ignored.] The results were not challenged by BAA or the inspector. They were however relegated to the Topic Report and ignored in the inspectors analysis and conclusions. Overall conclusions The inspector concluded I find that there are problems in terms of air quality in the area around Heathrow which mean that it is likely to be declared an Air Quality Management Area under the National Air Quality Strategy. If Terminal 5 were built it would exacerbate the difficulties in meeting the objectives of the Strategy and could make them virtually impossible to achieve. This must count against Terminal 5 but the failure to meet the objectives of the National Air Quality Strategy does not mean that planning permission must be refused for it. He added As far as the health effects of Terminal 5 including its associated road schemes are concerned, I conclude that it would result in increases in both NO2 and PM10. These increases would in turn increase the risk to human health by a small degree as compared to the position in 2016 with only 4 terminals. Again this must weigh against Terminal 5, although the fact that concentrations of both substances are likely to be substantially lower than in 1993 must also be taken into account. Conditions The inspector imposed 2 conditions. The first (AP93) is that BAA should produce a plan .. to show how BAA intend to minimise the emission of pollutants from and attributable to Heathrow Airport. The second is that during construction of T5, PM10 particles should be monitored and results provided to the LAs (AP125-127 etc). 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